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ICRC-installed sign warning of amphibious mines in the Azov Sea, Donetsk region.
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S

ince fighting began in 2014, significant areas of the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine have
been contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). This article will briefly cover the origin of
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and its
mandate, before turning to the types of contamination observed
by the SMM in eastern Ukraine. On 21 March 2014, the 57 participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) made a consensus decision to deploy the SMM, and
the SMM’s mandate has been extended each year since. The SMM establishes facts and reports on the security situation across Ukraine,
monitors and supports respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and facilitates dialogue.
The SMM has around 600 unarmed civilian monitors in eastern
Ukraine who patrol accessible areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) forms a
major impediment to the SMM’s freedom of movement across these
regions, a fact tragically highlighted by a fatal incident on 23 April
2017 near Pryshyb, after which the SMM’s patrols have been limited
to asphalt and concrete surfaces only.1
In terms of mine action, in signing the Minsk memorandum in
September 2014, the sides have already agreed to remove all mines
and not to install or lay mines in the security zone.2 There is an
urgent need to clear contaminated residential areas, and items of
ERW pose a serious danger to civilians crossing the area between
the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of
the armed formations.3
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An unexploded PG-7L grenade lies by the side of the road in the
area separating the armed parties. The bottles were placed there
by locals to alert drivers to the presence of the UXO as emergency services are not able to operate in the zone, 7 March 2017.
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

TM-62P3 mine, Donetsk region.
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

Lack of Information

One of the key problems from a mine action perspective is the
lack of comprehensive non-technical surveys (NTS) in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, owing—among other factors—to a lack of access to large areas of the contact line as the conflict remains active.4,5
Many important NTS have been done, in particular in governmentcontrolled areas, but the international and government organizations
that undertake surveys are mostly unable to work in the contact line
area for obvious reasons, and no known form of NTS has been undertaken in the non-government-controlled areas.
This lack of information is a key impediment to the SMM, as it
undertakes its work in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and directly affects the safety of SMM patrol teams. For this reason, as well as
overall monitoring of commitment to the Minsk memorandum, the
SMM—while not a mine action organization—takes a keen interest
in the presence of ERW, reporting on these in its daily reports. This
information comes not just from SMM patrol teams on the ground—
which have unique access to many areas on both sides of the contact
line—but also via the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which
help the SMM to overcome some of the freedom of movement restrictions imposed by the presence of ERW.
Anti-tank and Anti-vehicle mines (ATM/AVM).6 By far, AVMs
comprise the most prevalent type of mine contamination observed
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The most common AVM type is
the TM-62M, with the plastic-bodied TM-62P3 also being observed
in fewer numbers. An unusual feature of the mine contamination

TM-83 off-route mine, Donetsk region.
Image courtesy of OSCE/Jacek Hajdukiewicz.

observed by the OSCE SMM, compared to comparable minefields in
other contemporary conflicts, is the prevalence of surface-laid AVM
minefields. These range from small minefields across tarmac roads
that comprise only a few mines to surface-laid minefields across large
open fields. An SMM UAV recently identified a surface-laid linear
minefield, most probably laid by a mechanical minelayer, which was
2.7 km (1.7 mi) in length and contained an estimated 900 AVM.7
The TM-83 off-route AVM has also been observed in small numbers in the Donetsk region, seen for the first time by the SMM in
2019.8 Additionally, parts of the coast in the Donetsk region are
known to be contaminated by PDM-1M amphibious mines. SMM
monitors observed some of this mine laying taking place, and the
same event was widely reported in open source media.9
Anti-personnel mines (APM). Prior to the start of hostilities, the
government of Ukraine had declared that no APM were emplaced
on Ukrainian territory. With the subsequent emplacement of such
mines, Ukraine in 2018 requested an extension of its deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) to remove
them. The Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC granted the extension, until 1 June 2021, at its 17th meeting in November 2018.10
The SMM has observed a number of APM types across the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
The OZM-72 bounding APM have been observed across the conflict area, and has been reported on by the SMM on numerous occasions.11 Other AP mine types observed include the MON-series
directional APM and the POM-2 APM.12 The SMM has also observed
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POM-2 APM in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration station, Donetsk region .
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

other evidence of APM use, such as the presence of the plastic
cruciform-shaped tripwire launchers from POM-2 APMs scattered
across tarmac roads in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration
station. OSCE monitors have been present during the demolition of
PMN-2 APMs by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.13,14
Unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM has observed and reported on thousands of items of UXO on both sides of the line of
contact. These range from small-arms ammunition all the way up to
unexploded 300 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets. An exhaustive list of all types of explosive hazards is beyond the
scope of this article.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams conduct spot tasks on
both sides of the contact line, and the SMM has enjoyed some success
in reporting items of UXO to the respective sides and advocating for
their removal.15 However, an area of difficulty is the area between the
forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the
armed formations, where neither side is able or willing to risk their
personnel in clearing items of ERW left behind by shooting.2,3
On several occasions, the SMM has observed items of ERW lying at the entry-exit checkpoints between the two sides.2 These entryexit checkpoints are already dangerous places for civilians, who are
exposed to long queues in areas that lack adequate shelter, water, or
proper sanitary resources, and who sometimes come under fire. The
presence of ERW in close proximity, sometimes only a few meters
away from queueing pedestrians or vehicles, only adds to these risks.
As an example, a PG-7L round was observed on 7 March 2017, lying on the H15 highway in the area between the forward positions of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations. 3,16
This entry-exit checkpoint is one of the busiest and is used by thousands of civilians a day. Owing to the lack of EOD capacity able to
work in the area between the forward positions, the round remained
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on the highway for several days, indicated with informal marking, before disappearing, probably removed by a civilian.
Another issue of particular note is the presence of high-explosive
bullets across the conflict area. The 12.7 mm MDZ snap action incendiary round has a small, high-explosive charge. A number of civilian
casualties have been attributed to this round, with some occurring to
young children who have picked them up. Painted bright red, they are
often mistaken for standard incendiary rounds, and people are usually unaware of the dangers associated with them.

Conclusion

The lack of information on the mine contamination situation in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine remains one of the
key dangers to civilians in eastern Ukraine, as well as being one of
the main impediments to the SMM’s freedom of movement in the
area. Forwarding information about facts on the ground, including the risks posed to civilians by ERW, is one way that the SMM
makes a contribution toward a safer, more secure environment for
civilians.
See endnotes page 69
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